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Local debt expansion and vulnerability reduction:  
an assessment for six crisis-prone countries
1 
Paloma Acevedo, Enrique Alberola and Carmen Broto
2 
1. Introduction 
The ratios of public and external debt to GDP constitute crucial indicators in assessing the 
financial and fiscal vulnerability of a country. On the one hand, high ratios of public debt 
jeopardise its sustainability and its solvency position. On the other hand, a high proportion of 
exchange rate exposure in debt composition may abruptly worsen its sustainability in times 
of financial stress, characterised by problems of access to external markets or by sharp 
exchange rate movements. 
In some emerging markets, external and domestic debt denominated in foreign currency 
(both henceforth referred to as foreign exchange, or forex, debt) have played an important 
role in the structure of public sector debt because these markets could not issue debt locally 
or in local currency. This constraint is a phenomenon sometimes referred to in the literature 
as “the original sin” (Eichengreen and Hausman (1999)). The decreasing trend of public debt 
over GDP in recent years has been accompanied simultaneously and more intensely in 
many countries by a decrease in the corresponding share of forex debt and has coincided 
with a period of widespread appreciation of exchange rates.
3 These countries have therefore 
seen this evolution as signalling a breakthrough: their financial prospects are improved 
because their financial vulnerability is reduced. 
Our goal in this paper is to assess quantitatively this vulnerability reduction and its 
reversibility under financial turbulence. We focus on six countries that provide an adequate 
sample of emerging regions: Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Turkey and 
Uruguay. 
We selected these countries among those undergoing crises in the last decade primarily 
because of data availability. In addition, they exemplify the generalisation of the downward 
trend of public and forex debt. We chose quasi-gross public debt as the type of debt to 
include in our analysis so that we could obtain a homogeneous sample of data across the 
countries and detect in the data the effect of the accumulation of reserves – which is also a 
central consideration.
4 
                                                  
1   The opinions expressed in this document are solely the authors’ and do not represent the views of the Banco 
de España. We would like to thank Jose Montero, Iikka Korhonen and participants in the “CGFS Workshop on 
Balance Sheet Effects and Emerging Markets Bond Spreads” at the Bank of England (London), the emerging 
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helpful comments received. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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3    See, for instance, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (2007) for a recent general view concerning 
public debt in emerging countries. 
4   The choice among gross debt, net debt and any alternative type of measure of debt is not trivial. As stated in 
IADB (2007), although many countries provide measures of net debt, netting strategies differ across countries, 
so net debt does not constitute a homogeneous measure. Furthermore, gross debt does not capture the effect 
of international reserves. See Cowan et al (2006) or IMF (2003) for alternative debt definitions that are 
different from quasi-gross public debt.  
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Because no homogeneous database exists that perfectly suits the period of time and 
disaggregation required by this research, in all but two cases we collected data directly from 
the specific debt data releases of official institutions. For Russia and Indonesia we used 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data. We decomposed quasi-gross debt into foreign debt 
(issued in international debt markets) versus local debt (issued in domestic debt markets). 
We then made a further distinction between local debt linked to the exchange rate and local 
debt linked to local currency when that distinction was available. Table 1 shows the sources 
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government 
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1  Domestic and external debt.    
2  Used to calculate the breakdown of domestic public debt. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Figure 1 displays the ratio of public sector debt to GDP for these countries in 2005 and in the 
year of the highest outstanding debt during the past decade, which in most cases coincides 
with episodes of financial turmoil (see Manasse and Roubini (2005) or de Bolle et al (2006) 
for a dating of financial crises). The graph shows both the gross debt holdings and debt net 




Gross and quasi-gross public sector debt, selected countries 
As a percentage of GDP 











































































































































BR CO ID  RS  TK  UY
Currency-linked 
Not currency-linked 
BR = Brazil; CO = Colombia; ID = Indonesia; RS = Russia; TK = Turkey; UY = Uruguay 
1  Domestic debt plus external debt net of international reserves. 
Source: See Table 1 for variable definitions and sources. 
As Figure 1 shows, Russia had the most significant debt reduction. Quasi-gross public debt 
within the sample shrank about 99 percentage points (pp) of GDP between 1999 and 2005 to 
become negative, due to the country’s large reserve accumulation.
5 In Turkey and Indonesia, 
the reduction was 34 pp and 24 pp of GDP, respectively, from 2001 to 2005.
6 Brazil also 
exemplifies these dynamics: in 2002 its quasi-gross public sector debt was 74% of GDP, 
whereas in 2005 it decreased to around 68% of GDP. The quasi-gross public sector debt in 
Uruguay and Colombia fell around 13% and 6%, respectively, from 2003 to 2005. It is 
remarkable that the reduction in debt has been accompanied by an overall reduction in the 
share of forex debt (external debt, domestic debt in foreign currency or debt linked to the 
exchange rate). 
Figure 2 clearly shows the reduction of the proportion of forex debt. This figure represents 
the evolution of the debt composition in terms of external debt, exchange rate-linked 
domestic debt and domestic debt in local currency for the same periods. The decline in the 
forex debt share is more dramatic in Brazil, Turkey and Colombia (40%, 28% and 18%, 
respectively). Also notable is the reduction in exchange rate-linked domestic debt in the two 
Latin American countries,
7 to the point that exchange rate-linked domestic debt was 
suppressed in Brazil by 2006. Only in Indonesia did the proportion of external debt increase 
in the later years. 
                                                  
5   Henceforth, for Russia only, we develop our analysis of public debt in terms of gross public debt rather than 
quasi-gross public debt. Otherwise, since quasi-gross debt is currently negative, the corresponding results for 
the rest of the analysis would be misleading. 
6   For Indonesia, the year 2001 is considered to be the previous peak of public debt, mainly because of data 
availability, although according to other papers (ie de Bolle et al (2006)), the most recent turmoil is traceable 
back to 1998. 
7   See Jeanneau and Tovar (2006) for a recent discussion of the evolution of domestic markets in Latin America 
and Tovar (2005) for a detailed analysis of debt denominated in local currency in the three Latin American 
countries of the sample (Uruguay, Colombia and Brazil).  
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Figure 2 
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Brazil Colombia Indonesia Russia² Turkey Uruguay 
External net of reserves Domestic currency-linked Domestic other
1  In per cent.    
2  Gross public debt used for calculations. 
Source: See Table 1 for variable definitions and sources. 
There are two categories of explanations for this development of both the public and the 
forex debt. Figure 3, which shows the evolution of the nominal exchange rate and the 
sovereign spreads, illustrates the first category: an international context of very favourable 
financial conditions have influenced public debt considerably. As we shall see, the second 
category is closely related to the first, i.e. the creation of proactive policies to manage public 
debt has also been significant. 
Regarding the favourable international financial context, some aspects are worth qualifying. 
For instance, just as exchange rate crises make debt explosive in countries with a large 
share of forex debt, real exchange rate appreciations can dramatically decrease debt ratios 
and have an impact on the structure of debt. This is precisely what happened after the crises. 
The exchange rate recoveries were generalised, as shown in the real exchange rate 
evolutions in Figure 4. The appreciation of the Russian rouble (a 64% real appreciation 
between 1999 and 2005), the Turkish lira (a 44% real appreciation between 2001 and 2005) 
and the Brazilian real (26% between 2002 and 2005) were the most significant. The Indonesian 
rupee is the only currency of the sample that depreciated from 2003 to 2005 (6%) – precisely 
the only country where the share of forex debt increased. The positive period for emerging 
financial markets is also confirmed by the dynamics of sovereign spreads that have narrowed 
in a context of increasing capital flows. In this sense, the EMBI Global Composite decreased 
around 900 basis points from January 1999 to October 2006, and this reduction of sovereign 
spreads was especially severe in emerging Europe, where in the same period it narrowed 
around 2000 basis points. 
Another factor contributing to this benign financial framework is the favourable behaviour of 
the GDP growth rates in all emerging regions in the context of propitious world growth. For 
instance, the annual percent change of growth in 2005 for such emerging regions as 
developing Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America was 9.0%, 5.4% and 4.3% – 
well above the 2.6% rate of growth for advanced economies in 2005 and higher or similar to 
world growth (4.9%) (see IMF (2006)). 
As for the proactive debt management factor, the evolution of public and forex debt is closely 
related to the development of local debt markets in local currency. Fiscal authorities began to 
attach increasing importance to reducing in a sustainable manner the vulnerability of public 
finances, and began to create more proactive debt policies to manage public debt in this 
direction. They had learned their lesson from past experience, when excessive exchange 
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Note: Dates of crisis episodes considered: Brazil (2002); Colombia and Uruguay (2003); Indonesia and Turkey 
(2001); and Russian Federation (1999). 
1  National currency per US dollar and spreads in thousands of basis points.    
2  EMBI + index.    
3  MBI Global 
Index.    
4  Exchange rate in thousands of units per US dollar.    
5  ABI index. 
Source: Datastream. 
The link between benign conditions and proactive policies derives from another factor. The 
favourable financial conditions and the expected behaviour of the exchange rate, which 
increased the relative demand for local debt and the ability of the authorities to place it on the 
market, also encouraged authorities to make discretionary changes to the debt composition. 
Interestingly, the conjunction of these two factors has created a paradox worth mentioning. In 
an environment of currency appreciation, authorities trying to maximise debt reduction in the 
short term have an incentive to maintain or increase the share of forex debt, as this would 
decrease public debt as a percentage of GDP, leading to some sort of “virtuous circle”. 
Conversely, a reduction of forex debt as a result of active debt management tends to mitigate 
debt reduction driven by exchange rate appreciation. Contingent on financial turbulence, 
however, this “paradox of the local debt bias” can be solved. In such a case, the exchange  
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rate should sharply depreciate and, if there has previously been a reduction in the proportion 
of forex debt in total debt, then the country is better able to absorb the impact of the negative 
scenario. The comparison between the short-term costs of debt reduction and the long-term 
(contingent) benefits is one of the by-products of our analysis.
8 
Figure 4 







1998  1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
Brazil (2002)  Indonesia (2001)
Turkey (2001)  Colombia (2003)
Russia (1999)  Uruguay (2003)
Note: Year of major outstanding debt in brackets; dotted line thereafter. 
1  1998 = 100. 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
For our analysis, we develop a quantitative approach to assess the effective vulnerability 
reduction in the debt composition and the precise contribution of proactive debt 
management. First, in the next section, we disentangle the contribution of the exchange rate 
to the shifts in debt structure from other autonomous or genuine composition effects in the 
structure of debt. Following that, we develop a theoretical framework of debt dynamics 
analysis, and then perform a counterfactual exercise based on calculating public debt 
dynamics under the previous debt structure. In this way we can assess the change in 
vulnerability based on the difference in percentage points of GDP between the actual debt 
and the debt resulting from this counterfactual exercise. Then, we replicate the previous 
crisis scenario of economic and financial turbulence for the period 2006–08 and perform a 
stress test analysis of debt sustainability. We also use alternative criteria to design the stress 
as a test of robustness. Finally, we summarise our findings. 
2.  Public debt composition: disentangling price and composition 
effects 
This section focuses on setting a framework for analysis of the effects of the shifts in forex 
debt (the sum of external and domestic exchange rate-indexed debt) on total public debt. 
The share of forex debt,  t α  is defined as 
                                                  
8   In this paper, we focus on the sustainability-vulnerability assessment concerning the exchange rate-linked 
debt. We do not address other topics on debt composition – such as long-term versus short-term debt or 
nominal versus indexed debt – even though there is intense debate on these issues. See, for instance, Alfaro 
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D e t t
t
+
= α  (1) 
where  t e  is the nominal exchange rate in the period t, 
*
t D  is the amount of outstanding forex 
debt, either external debt or exchange rate-linked domestic debt, denominated in dollars in t, 
and  t D  is the outstanding domestic debt denominated in local currency in period t.
9 
Within this framework, it is rather straightforward to evaluate the importance of the effect of 
the exchange rate and the effect due to the composition of debt on the total variation in 
composition. The total variation of the ratios of forex debt to total debt between the final 
(t = 1) and the initial (t = 0) periods of reference, that is, (α1 – α0), can be decomposed in 
these two effects, as follows: 
ε + + = α − α CE EE 0 1  (2) 
where the first part of the right-hand side of (2) (EE) is the exchange rate effect and CE is the 
composition effect. The residual term ε  in the expression will be allocated between both 
effects, as we explain below. 
EE is the variation in the proportion of external debt. It is indexed to a foreign currency 
domestic debt resulting from variations in the exchange rate obtained by keeping the amount 









EE  (3) 
where the first element in the right-hand side of EE will be denoted as α1
E. 
CE is the variation of α due to the changes in the relative volumes of the different types of 









CE  (4) 
where, analogously to (3), the first element in the right-hand side of (4) will be denoted as 
α1
C. 
In this last type of effect, the effect of proactive management policies arises, although other 
factors, such as the relative demand and supply of debt instruments, may also be prominent. 
The allocation of the residual change to each factor is made according to the scheme in 
Figure 5. Notice that the whole variation in the forex debt share (that is, α1–α0) is the area 
defined by coordinates e1D1* minus e0D0* (the area shadowed with vertical lines). EE as stated 
in the previous notation would be the area comprising α1
E–α0 and CE would be α1
C–α0 (the 
yellow and green shaded areas, respectively). The remaining area should be equally 
distributed between EE and CE in order to accurately represent the difference between the 
vectors α1 and α0. 
                                                  
9   See Calvo et al (2002) for a pioneering analysis of fiscal sustainability incorporating the currency composition 
of debt.  
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Figure 5 
Public debt decomposition 
e0 
e1 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
The factorial decomposition of EE and CE is represented in Figure 6 for the six countries in 
terms of the percentage points that each factor has contributed to the reduction in the share 
of foreign currency debt, considering that t = 1 is 2005 and t = 0 is the year of the 
corresponding debt crisis for each country. We use as reference for this exercise the public 
debt net of reserves (quasi-gross public debt), except for Russia, where such magnitude is 
negative. 
Figure 6 









Brazil Colombia Indonesia Russia² Turkey Uruguay
Composition effect (CE)
Exchange rate effect  (EE)
Total effect 
1  Variation of the ratios of forex debt to total quasi-gross public debt between the crisis episode and the year 
2005, in per cent.    
2  Gross public debt used for calculations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national data. 
Despite the strong exchange rate appreciation, CE dominates in all countries but Indonesia, 
where it contributes to the increase in the share of forex debt. In absolute terms, CE is 
largest in Brazil: 34% of the 40% reduction in the forex debt share is due to CE. However, in 
relative terms, it is even more significant in Turkey: 26% of the 28% reduction is CE – in 
other words, more than 90% of the reduction is due to CE. For the average of the five 
countries where the share of foreign currency debt is reduced, 85% of the reduction can be 
attributed to the pure composition effect. 96  BIS Papers No 36
 
 
3.  The framework of analysis: debt dynamics 
Public debt sustainability analysis (DSA) is an increasingly widespread tool used to assess 
the vulnerability position of public finances. In recent years, more attention has been paid to 
this approach in policy analysis, most notably in IMF country assessments. A growing 
number of papers also employ DSA – sometimes from a stochastic approach (eg see 
Celasun et al (2006), Hostland and Karan (2005) or Garcia and Rigobon (2004)). Apart from 
its simplicity, the main advantage of this methodology for our objectives is that it can provide 
an explicit measure of vulnerability that can be traced over time and is well-suited to the 
stress test analysis. 
DSA focuses on the debt dynamics equations that are determined, in a simplified framework, 
by a rather limited number of variables. Furthermore, forecasts for most of these variables 
are readily available on the market. These forecasts allow us to establish a baseline scenario 
for the future evolution of debt. The framework is also useful for visualizing how debt would 
respond to a situation of stress by changing the forecasts using estimates of the variables 
under negative shocks. These stress tests compound alternative scenarios; this gives an 
idea of the resilience of debt and therefore of the vulnerability of the public finance position. 
The starting point is the debt dynamics equation expressed as: 
,
) 1 (
























PB D  (5) 
where PBt is the primary balance and Dt is the stock of public debt at the end of time t, both 
expressed as a ratio of GDP. The share of debt denominated in foreign exchange is αt, as 
we already know, while (1–αt) is the share of local currency debt; r*t and rt are their 
corresponding real interest rates. Foreign-denominated external debt can be in foreign 
currency (mostly external debt) or indexed to the exchange rate (mostly domestic debt). 
Finally, Δet is the variation in the nominal exchange rate, where a positive Δet means an 
exchange rate depreciation and gt is the real rate of growth. 
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PB D  (6) 
where, for simplicity, we have dropped the contingent liabilities. This equation is the basis for 
the sustainability exercises performed in the DSA. Given the current level and composition of 
debt, for given forecasts of the primary balance, the growth rate, the nominal exchange rate 
and the real interest rates (domestic and foreign), it is possible to project debt trajectories. 
Increases in the ratio of debt to GDP derived from these exercises provide a measure of 
vulnerability, and a decrease in the ratio suggests a reduction in vulnerability. 
Expression (6) can be transformed in a more convenient way by separating the effect of the 




) 1 ( ) 1 (












α + α −


















PB D  (7) 
For practical purposes, it is important to note that the real interest rates by instrument or 
currency are not usually available, so that we have to find a way to measure the approximate 
real cost of local and forex debt. Data exist on interest payments on public debt: IPt, which 
can be defined as 
, ) ) 1 ( ) 1 (( 1 1
*
− − ρ = Δ + α + α − = t t t t t t t t t D D r e r IP  (8)  
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where, for convenience, ρt denotes the average cost of debt at time t. ρt can be calculated in 







  (9) 
For completeness and further convenience, also note that the implicit local debt real rate can 











Δ + α − ρ
=  (10) 
so that if we are able to proxy for the real foreign cost of debt – through the spread, as it 
turns out – we derive an approximation of the respective real interest rate by country. 
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4.  Empirics: debt evolution, debt structure and vulnerability 
reductions 
These expressions provide us with an adequate framework to analyse what has been going 
on in the countries under consideration here. It is convenient to start with an illustrative 
example of how the different factors impinge on the evolution of debt and then move to a 
more detailed analysis of the impact of the shifts in debt structure on vulnerability. 
4.1  Contributions to debt reduction 
Computing the partial derivatives in expression (5) allows us to determine the contribution of 
each factor to the variation of Dt (ΔDt) on an annual basis. To focus on the issues we are 
more interested in, we consider the decomposition of the annual variation of Dt in terms of 
PBt (in this case, there is a one-to-one relationship), and the annual variation of the share of 
forex debt in total public debt (αt), the exchange rate (et) and, for the sake of simplicity, the 
remaining contributions (interest rates and rates of growth) are aggregated in a residual. 
Figure 7 illustrates the case of Brazil. The substantial magnitude of the primary balance is a 
powerful debt reduction driver throughout the period. However, the more interesting results 
are the interaction between the exchange rate and the share of forex debt αt. From 2001 to 
2002, the currency depreciated, and there was an important positive contribution to debt of 
9 pp of GDP. Thereafter, the appreciation of the exchange rate induced a negative 
contribution to public debt in GDP. The cumulative decrease in GDP from 2002 to 2005 was 
4%. In parallel, αt increased in the first, turbulent period. Owing to the contemporaneous 
exchange rate depreciation, this variable added 3 pp to the debt-to-GDP ratio (the green 
area in Figure 7). Both factors together (αt and exchange rate) amounted to a 12 pp increase 
in debt in 2002. However, in the following years, the interaction of currency appreciation and 
reduction in forex debt had a different result: the contribution of the dwindling share of forex 
debt is positive because it mitigates the effect of the exchange rate appreciation on debt 
reduction. Finally, the residual picks up the combined contribution of interest rates, growth 




Annual variation of public debt in GDP 















1  As a percentage of GDP.    
2  Share of forex debt in total debt, in per cent. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national data. 
4.2  A counterfactual exercise: debt reductions without proactive management 
policies 
The Brazilian example highlights the fact that the interaction between exchange rate 
appreciations and reductions in the forex share can work against debt reduction. This is the 
“paradox of the local debt bias” that we pointed out in the introduction. But we also noted 
later that the changes in debt structure (see Figure 6) are in part mechanically driven by the 
evolution of the exchange rate. In fact, we showed that a substantial part of the reduction in 
forex debt was not due to the exchange rate evolutions but rather to pure composition 
effects, in which the proactive debt management policies of the authorities have had a 
central role. 
Now, within the debt dynamics framework, we can give a quantitative assessment of the 
(negative) impact of proactive debt management on debt reduction. The question is 
straightforward: what would the level of debt be today, netting out the composition effect – 
that is, looking at it without proactive debt management? 
Obtaining the computations of α1
E as stated in (3) on a yearly basis, we can determine 
counterfactual debt paths for the public debt ratio. Figure 8 shows the results of this exercise 
as carried out for all six countries. The blue line represents the actual public debt trajectory. 
Netting out the pure composition effect delivers the path represented by the green line. The 
graph is completed with the opposite exercise, shown by the red line. In this case, we 
consider the pure composition effect but assume that the impact brought about by the 
exchange rate evolutions disappears – that is, we assume this to be the current debt level, 
had the real exchange rate been kept constant. 
Table 2 summarises the outcomes of the counterfactual exercise for the six countries. In the 
case of Brazil, the actual path displays debt falling from 74% to 68% of GDP. However, this 
decrease is actually much greater, around 60% in 2005, when we net out the pure 
composition effect. The reason for this difference is that the dwindling forex debt does not 
fully capitalise the impact of the real exchange rate appreciation. To sum up for Brazil, the 
implicit loss, in terms of percentage points of debt to GDP, derived from proactive debt 
management would mean that the level of debt would now be a sizeable 8 pp of GDP. This 
can be taken as a measure of the opportunity costs of substituting local debt in local currency  
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for forex debt. On the contrary, if the nominal exchange rate had remained at the 2002 
levels, the quasi-gross public debt in 2005 would have been around 79% of GDP. 
Figure 8 
Actual vs counterfactual debt evolution, selected countries
1 
As a percentage of GDP 
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1  Public debt net of reserves (quasi-gross debt).    
2  Gross public debt used for calculations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national data. 
In Turkey, these proactive policies have also been quite pronounced. There, netting the 
change in composition due to the government’s debt management means that the public 
debt in 2005 would be 10 pp of GDP less. In the rest of the countries where the reduction in 
the share of forex debt in total public debt has been relatively small or has not taken place 
(ie  Colombia, Indonesia, Russian Federation and Uruguay), the difference between the 
actual path of public debt and the public debt under constant composition of the year of crisis 
is also small (this difference represents less than 1 pp of the GDP of each country).  
Brazil and Turkey are clear examples of where the “opportunity costs” of diminishing the 
share of forex debt in total public debt are more evident, due to both the intense exchange 
rate appreciations and the efforts by the fiscal authorities to recompose debt in favour of local 





Counterfactual exercise results for 2005 
Counterfactual (2005)  Brazil  Colombia Indonesia Russia  Turkey  Uruguay 
Public debt net of 
reserves/GDP 68.5%  44.4%  34.6% 14.5% 57.1% 71.9% 
Debt/GDP net of exchange 
rate effect  74.0% 47.3% 30.4% 54.6% 65.7% 90.3% 
Debt/GDP net of 
composition effect  60.0%  43.8% 34.4% 14.7% 47.3% 72.3% 
Points of debt/GDP due to 
composition effect  5.5  2.9  –4.2  40.1  8.6  18.4 
Points of debt/GDP due to 
exchange rate effect  –8.5  –0.5  –0.2  0.2  –9.7  0.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Some important caveats, however, give a more nuanced view of the opportunity costs of 
moving out of forex debt. Most important is that this is a partial exercise. We are assuming 
that nothing else changes, but this is quite an assumption. As mentioned above, fiscal 
authorities could not have developed the local debt markets as swiftly under more stringent 
financial conditions. More importantly, the very same evolution of the exchange rate is not far 
from the evolution of debt composition; the reduction in external debt, a process deepened 
by very active policies in Brazil, shapes the expectation of agents and has probably 
contributed to a greater pressure on the exchange rate and fostered a higher accumulation of 
reserves (and thus a bigger reduction of quasi-gross debt). 
From the second type of exercise, where the exchange rate is kept unaltered, some 
interesting conclusions also follow. As expected, the numbers show that debt dynamics 
would have been much less favourable under the exchange rates of the year of crises for the 
six countries – except for Indonesia and Russia, where the nominal exchange rate has 
appreciated with respect to their years of crises. The more damaged country in terms of 
maintaining the same nominal exchange rate would have been Uruguay, which would have 
increased its debt 18 pp of GDP. 
All in all, under the perspective taken in this section, it might seem that proactive policies to 
reduce the share of forex debt in total GDP have entailed costs in terms of limited debt 
reduction. Nevertheless, this short-term cost must be balanced with the prospective benefits 
derived from a less forex-dependent debt structure in cases of financial turbulence. 
4.3  Stress test: resilience in debt vulnerability 
The standard DSA framework based on stress testing consists of designing a situation of 
turbulence (or stress) comparable to the most recent crises to determine whether 
vulnerability has effectively been reduced and then contrasting it with a baseline scenario. 
The first step, then, is to define the baseline scenario. With forecasts from the IMF’s Article IV 
reports for the countries under study (2003–2006) and LatinFocus Consensus Forecast (2006) 
over a three-year horizon (2006, 2007 and 2008), we obtained the raw data to project the 
debt paths. 
This methodology is useful for improving the homogeneity of the analysis and for comparing 
the different outcomes with those provided by the IMF. Next, we designed the stress  
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scenario to replicate the most recent financial turmoil experienced by these countries – 
coinciding, as we showed above, with the previous peak in debt. Table 3 displays the data 
underlying the baseline and the stress scenarios. The changes therein are applied to all 




Baseline scenario and stress scenario for the simulation of debt dynamics 
In per cent 
  Baseline scenario  Stress scenario 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Brazil            
Exchange rate
1   –12.2  –4.3  3.6  0.0  –12.2  50.3  7.9  18.5 
Real GDP growth  2.3  3.5  4.0 3.5  2.3  –0.8  –0.3 3.3 
GDP deflator  7.2  4.0  4.2  4.4  7.2  7.5  7.7  7.9 
Interest rate (i)
2 13.5  14.3  12.9  12.4  13.5  14.9  15.5  12.3 
Interest rate (i*)
3 7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  11.6  11.6  11.6 
Primary balance
4 4.8  4.3  4.3  4.2  4.8  0.0  3.2  3.5 
Implicit liabilities
4, 5 –0.5  3.0  3.0  0.0  –0.5  3.0  3.0  0.0 
Colombia               
Exchange rate
1   –5.4  6.5  3.4  0.0  –5.4  24.0  –2.6  –13.3 
Real GDP growth  5.2  5.2  4.5 4.0  5.2 2.3  –2.4 4.7 
GDP deflator  5.5  4.7  4.1  3.5  5.5  5.3  7.4  6.4 
Interest rate (i)
2 8.6  12.2  11.6  10.2  8.6  13.1  12.7  11.2 
Interest rate (i*)
3 6.8  6.8  6.8  6.8  6.8  8.8  8.8  8.8 
Primary balance
4 3.5  3.1  2.4  2.2  3.5  0.9  0.9  –0.3 
Implicit liabilities
4, 5 0.3  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Indonesia               
Exchange rate
1   6.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.0  15.6  –3.1  2.2 
Real GDP growth  5.6  5.2  6.0 6.5  5.6 4.5 4.9 5.7 
GDP deflator  13.7  13.2  6.5  6.5  13.7  16.7  6.0  4.4 
Interest rate (i)
2 6.1  5.7  5.5  5.7  6.1  –3.1  3.4  5.6 
Interest rate (i*)
3 7.4  7.4  7.4  7.4  7.4  25.8  16.6  7.4 
Primary balance
4 2.2  1.2  1.3  1.1  2.2  0.4  0.5  0.3 
Implicit liabilities
4, 5 0.3  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
For footnotes, see the end of the table. 
 
                                                  
10  In those isolated cases with no data available for the period of crisis, we obtained the negative shock by 
adding to the data in the baseline scenario one standard deviation of the available data. 102  BIS Papers No 36
 
 
Table 3 (cont) 
Baseline scenario and stress scenario for the simulation of debt dynamics 
In per cent 
  Baseline scenario  Stress scenario 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Russia            
Exchange rate
1    –1.8  0.0 0.0 0.0  –1.8  153.3  14.4 3.7 
Real GDP growth  6.4  6.5  6.5  6.1  6.4 –0.3 11.4 15.0 
GDP  deflator  19.6  15.6 8.9 6.2  19.6  32.5  27.8  25.1 
Interest rate (i)
2  7.7  10.8  9.2 17.4  7.7 38.8 19.9 22.8 
Interest rate (i*)
3  5.6  5.6 5.6 5.6  5.6  23.5  13.9 7.6 
Primary balance
4  9.2  10.0 8.7 7.8  9.2  –3.6 2.9 7.5 
Implicit liabilities
4, 5  –0.5  3.0 3.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Turkey            
Exchange rate
1    0.7  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.7  116.4  13.1  –14.6 
Real GDP growth  7.4  5.0  5.0 5.0  7.4  –7.4 8.0 5.9 
GDP  deflator  5.4  7.0 5.0 5.0  5.4  26.8  42.2  56.8 
Interest rate (i)
2  24.6  22.9 22.2 22.4  24.6 90.1  112.4  122.9 
Interest rate (i*)
3  6.6  6.6 6.6 6.6  6.6 9.5 9.5 9.5 
Primary balance
4  6.5  6.5 6.5 6.5  6.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Implicit liabilities
4, 5  –0.5  3.0 3.0 0.0  –0.5 3.0 3.0 0.0 
Uruguay            
Exchange rate
1   –10.2  2.7 2.8 0.0  –10.2  84.2 7.8  –9.9 
Real GDP growth  6.6  4.6  4.2 2.8  6.6  –1.1 0.2 1.2 
GDP  deflator  1.7  5.1 3.8 4.0  1.7  15.0  14.8 3.8 
Interest rate (i)
2  –6.9  6.5 6.3 8.6  –6.9 9.9 9.5  19.8 
Interest rate (i*)
3  7.4  7.4 7.4 7.4  7.4  15.0  15.0  15.0 
Primary balance
4  3.9  3.7 4.0 4.0  3.9 0.1 2.7 3.8 
Implicit liabilities
4, 5 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1  Variation of national currency per US dollar.    
2  Nominal domestic interest rate.    
3  Nominal external interest 
rate.    
4  As a percentage of GDP.    
5  Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF data. 
 
Figure 9 and Table 4 present the results. Looking again at Brazil as illustrative, the blue 
dotted line represents the baseline scenario and the orange dotted line stands for debt 
dynamics under the stress scenario. Both debt evolutions employed the path of α under debt 
composition for the year 2005. As expected under the baseline scenario – conveying the 
continuation of favourable conditions – quasi-gross debt gradually decreases towards 60% of 
GDP, while debt increases under the stress scenario and then stabilises above 70%.  
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Figure 9 
Baseline and stress scenarios, selected countries 
As a percentage of GDP 













































99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
1  Public debt net of reserves (quasi-gross debt).    
2  Stress with debt composition net of composition effect.    
3  Stress with current debt composition.    
4  Stress under counterfactual debt composition, defined as the year of 
major outstanding debt as it appears in Figure 1.    
5    Current structure.    
6    Gross public debt used for 
calculations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national data. 
What would the impact of the turmoil have been if the debt structure had been kept unaltered 
relative to the year of crisis? The red line provides a first, but inadequate, approximation. It 
represents the impact of the stress test with the debt structure net of the pure CE (but leaving EE 
operating) and starting from the current level of debt (2005). Notice that the evolution is much 
more explosive under the current debt structure. Had debt management not been proactive,
11 
the increase would have been much larger (to over 95%), as the red line shows, setting the debt 
on an explosive path. The gap between both lines – more than 20 pp of GDP over a three-year 
horizon – is indicative of the importance of a less forex-exposed debt structure. 
 
                                                  
11   To be more precise, the 2002 debt composition permits the exchange rate to affect the structure but nets out 



























Comparison of stress scenarios 
  Brazil Colombia  Indonesia 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Baseline scenario
1 0.69  0.65  0.61  0.59  0.44  0.42  0.41 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.24 
Replica              
Under current 
structure 0.69  0.74  0.74 0.73 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.29 
Under counterfactual  0.60  0.76  0.79  0.83 0.44  0.49 0.51 0.49 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.28 
Gap
2 –0.09  0.02  0.04  0.10  –0.01  0.01  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Two standard 
deviations              
Under current 
structure 0.69  0.73  0.69 0.68 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.19 
Under counterfactual  0.60  0.76  0.74  0.73 0.44  0.50 0.52 0.55 0.34 0.28 0.23 0.19 
Gap
2 –0.09  0.04  0.04  0.05  –0.01  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Aggregated stress              
Under current 
structure 0.69  0.81  0.84 0.83 0.44 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.35 0.43 0.37 0.29 
Under counterfactual  0.60  0.89  0.95  0.93 0.44  0.59 0.59 0.56 0.34 0.41 0.35 0.28 
Gap
2 –0.09  0.08  0.11  0.10  –0.01  0.04  0.05 0.05 0.00  –0.02  –0.02  –0.02 




























Table 4 (cont) 
Comparison of stress scenarios 
  Russia Turkey  Uruguay 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Baseline scenario
1   0.15  –0.01  –0.12  –0.20  0.57  0.52 0.46 0.44 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.62 
Replica              
Under current 
structure 0.15  0.35  0.28 0.13 0.57 0.96 1.09 1.20 0.72 1.27 1.33 1.30 
Under counterfactual  0.16  0.41  0.33  0.18 0.47 0.95 1.11 1.18 0.72 1.31 1.37 1.34 
Gap
2  0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04  –0.10 0.00 0.03  –0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Two standard 
deviations              
Under current 
structure 0.15  0.18  0.09  –0.01 0.57 0.82 1.18 1.77 0.72 0.93 1.01 1.09 
Under counterfactual  0.16  0.21  0.11  0.00 0.47 0.69 0.99 1.47 0.72 0.95 1.03 1.11 
Gap
2 0.02  0.03  0.02  0.01  –0.10  –0.13  –0.19  –0.30 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Aggregated stress              
Under current 
structure 0.15  0.25  0.18 0.06 0.57 0.72 0.69 0.12 0.72 1.18 1.14 0.98 
Under counterfactual  0.16  0.29  0.22  0.09 0.47 0.68 0.66 0.11 0.72 1.21 1.18 1.01 
Gap
2 0.02  0.04  0.03  0.03  –0.10  –0.04  –0.03  –0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 
1  Under current debt composition.    
2  Represents the difference between stress under 2002 debt composition (counterfactual) and stress under current debt composition. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on national data. 
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Why is the red line misleading? We have seen in the counterfactual exercise that netting out 
pure composition effects would have resulted in a lower debt ratio in the case of Brazil, owing 
to the sustained real exchange rate appreciation. Thus, we have to compare the effective 
lower reduction in debt due to the proactive debt management policies to the prospective 
gains during a financial crisis. More precisely, the green line represents the debt dynamics 
assuming no pure composition effect – as in the red line – plus the level of debt resulting 
from the counterfactual exercise. This, in our view, is the right gauge to measure vulnerability 
reduction due to proactive debt management. In practical terms, this amounts to taking the 
end-point of the green line as a reference and projecting it forward under the stress scenario. 
The green line thus extended has a path similar to the red line, but it starts from a lower 
level. Consequently, the difference in the debt ratio is very small in the first year, and then 
widens to around 10 pp of GDP. We can take this figure as the net gain from Brazil’s debt 
management policy. In other words, the short-term costs of implementing proactive policies 
in order to decrease the share of forex debt in total debt are more than compensated for by 
the long-term gains of implementing them. 
For the other five countries, the forecasts under the baseline scenario are as follows. 
Colombia, Turkey and Uruguay decrease their debt towards 40%, 45% and 60% of GDP, 
respectively (blue line). Despite the evolution of its currency and the composition of its debt, 
Indonesia also reduces its debt to 25% of GDP. Finally, the forecast for Russia is especially 
favourable, as the gross debt decreases sharply to 25% of GDP – that is, not only is quasi-
gross debt negative, but so is gross debt. 
We can employ the stress scenario for the remaining countries in the same manner, although 
the results are less clear. Recall that the more interesting conclusions derive from 
comparison of the evolution of debt under the debt composition of the year of crisis (green 
line) and under the debt composition of 2005 (orange line). The comparison favours debt 
recomposition only in Russia, where the debt level is not currently a problem, and in 
Uruguay, to a lesser extent than in Brazil (see Table 4). Nevertheless, in some countries, 
such as Colombia, the benefit of the proactive policies implemented until 2005 gives rise to a 
scant average decrease in debt of 1 pp of GDP accumulated in the forecasted period. In the 
case of Turkey the accumulated differences after three years are negative (–1 pp GDP), 
although they were previously positive. In the case of Indonesia, the gap is negligible 
throughout the forecast scenario. 
It is important to keep in mind here the caveats we mentioned above because the direct 
inference from these results is that, except for Brazil, debt recomposition efforts do not seem 
to pay off in terms of vulnerability reduction under stress. Again, we base these caveats on 
the impact of these debt trajectories on expectations. It is difficult to assume that the reaction 
of the markets would be the same comparing the mild deterioration implied by the orange 
line with the sharp increase in debt under a less favourable debt structure. As a 
consequence, the evolution of the financial variables is reasonably expected to be worse in 
the second case. This endogeneity implies that the computation of net gains is a floor rather 
than a midpoint estimate. 
To check the robustness of the stress test, we repeat the exercise, considering two 
alternative assumptions for the design of the stress scenarios. First, following the 
methodology employed in most of the IMF’s Article IV, we add two standard deviations from 
the sample series to the corresponding data of the baseline scenario, denoted as 2SD.
12 
Second, we build a scenario on the average stress scenario (average stress, for short) for 
each variable of the six countries based on the historical criterion of the previous subsection. 
                                                  
12   Two standard deviations from the sample of each variable from the year of crisis to 2005 are added to each 
variable from 2006 to 2008 (both inclusive).  
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Table 4 shows the outcomes corresponding to these two new criteria. The results in general 
are quite robust under the three different alternatives, in terms of both the size of the shock 
and the direction vis-à-vis the two new stress scenarios designed. Indonesia and Turkey are 
the exceptions. For Indonesia, the exercise is not robust under the assumption of average 
stress, as public debt to GDP is lower under the stress scenario than under the baseline 
scenario. For Turkey, the gap between the stress under the debt structure of the year of 
crisis – that is, the counterfactual scenario – and the stress under the debt structure of 2005 
becomes negative, implying less resilience to a negative shock. For the other simulations, 
the results are almost the same and, in some cases – such as the results of the scenario 
based on averages for Colombia – show a lower debt under the current composition than 
under the previous composition. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have evaluated the impact of the shift of public debt away from foreign 
currency on the vulnerability of a group of selected emerging countries, which not so long 
ago underwent deep financial turbulence. 
We first emphasised that the ratio of public debt to GDP and, even more dramatically, the 
share of forex debt have been reduced in these emerging markets in a context of favourable 
financial conditions. Exchange rate appreciations helped to reduce both ratios. However, the 
proactive debt management of fiscal authorities – aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the 
debt composition – has been the dominant factor in quantitative terms in most of these 
countries. Clearly, a favourable external environment and exchange rate evolutions have 
facilitated this process, since expected exchange rate appreciation favours issuing debt in 
domestic currency. The development of local debt markets has both benefited from and 
facilitated this proactive debt management. 
The changes in debt structure are expected to have important implications for the reduction 
of financial vulnerability in public finances. However, our approach to this issue has 
uncovered a paradox related to the recent bias towards local debt. By reducing forex debt 
through proactive policies, governments have not taken full advantage of the real exchange 
appreciation enjoyed by their economies after the crises. Otherwise, the debt ratios in the 
analysed countries would have been lower than they are currently – and the difference is 
sizeable in certain cases. 
This opportunity cost underscores the dramatic shift in debt management strategies in most 
of these countries. In the past, governments used periods of benign external financial 
conditions to issue external debt, usually beyond what would be advisable and prudent from 
a fiscal point of view, and have thus set the stage for future financial problems and crises. 
They are now prepared to refrain from this temptation and even to dismiss part of the impact 
of the exchange rate appreciation on the debt ratios in the short term in order to strengthen 
their underlying financial position. This change in strategy thus contributes to a structural 
reinforcement of public finances and helps countries redeem themselves from the “original 
sin.” 
Fiscal authorities and analysts must take into account this short-term “opportunity cost” of 
shifting towards local debt so that they can assess the net benefits of proactive debt 
management policies. The stress tests suggest that even after controlling for these short-
term costs, there is a reduction in vulnerability derived from the proactive shift towards local 
debt, measured in most cases by the difference in the ratio of debt to GDP in a situation of 
stress, although the magnitude in ratio for some of the countries analysed is small. 
In interpreting the results, we have to take into account some qualifications. First, there is an 
important caveat that reinforces these results. Built into this exercise is a central assumption: 
the evolution of the variables that drive the debt-to-GDP ratio is independent of the ratio or  
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structure of debt. However, the behaviour of the financial variables is very much influenced 
by perceptions of debt vulnerability, a situation that is true both in the counterfactual and in 
the stress tests. More precisely, with a higher share of forex debt, the exchange rate 
appreciations would presumably have been lower in the later years and the deterioration of 
the financial variables in the stress test would have been higher. Another qualification is that 
the probability of turbulence is expected to increase under a debt structure very sensitive to 
financial volatility. These caveats taken together imply that the estimated reduction in 
vulnerability is a minimum boundary, and therefore that the effective vulnerability reduction is 
higher. 
On the whole, we showed that the move to local debt is positive in terms of vulnerability 
reduction. This finding can be considered an important breakthrough in emerging markets 
and used to improve their resilience in the face of eventual financial shocks as well as to 
reduce the shocks’ occurrence. 
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